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Abstract 
This paper argues that the United Kingdom is now in a state of constitutional unsettlement. A state 
of constitutional unsettlement is not, first, a settled constitution, nor is it, secondly, an unsettled 
constitution, nor thirdly, is it a written Constitutional settlement. Yet all of these other conditions 
are significant in placing the circumstances of constitutional unsettlement in historical and 
comparative relief. The UK used to have something like a settled constitution, though it meant, and 
continues to mean, very different things to different people; we then, quite recently, moved into the 
phase of an unsettled constitution, but one whose terminus has offered neither a return to a settled 
constitution nor arrival at a new – and for the UK unprecedented, documentary Constitutional 
settlement. Instead, the unsettled constitution has become normalized - or at least regularized - as a 
state of constitutional unsettlement, in which questions of EU membership, of devolution and 
independence, of human rights protection etc, are subject to continuous disputation with deeply 
uncertain long-term consequences, regardless of how they may be resolved in the present tense. 
There is much to be concerned with in our state of constitutional unsettlement. Nevertheless, the 
very idea of a condition of constitutional unsettlement need not be considered in principle and 
inevitably pathological. Rather, as a state of affairs that is be in the process of becoming more and 
more embedded in contemporary public life and less and less capable of wholesale or even 
measured undoing or transformation, then, short of fatalistic acceptance, we may have no option but 
to look for the positives. And, having done so, we may find in certain virtues of transparency, the 
primacy of the political, fluidity and adaptability of outcome, and less exclusive conceptions of 
constitutional identity, more positives than might have been anticipated. 
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Our constitutional unsettlement
1
 
 
 
1. An Unsettling Story  
 
The aim of this contribution is to capture something both distinctive and prognostic about the 
constitutional phase and situation in which we find ourselves in the United Kingdom today.  I 
describe this as a state of constitutional unsettlement.  
            What is meant by this how has it come about, and how might it develop? In trying to answer 
these questions, the argument will run from negative to positive. It will do so in two respects. First, 
as a matter of definition, we begin to  trace the outline  of the condition of constitutional 
unsettlement from the outside, so to speak,  by specifying and explaining what that  condition does 
not consist of, either because our constitution has never  been that way or because it may once have 
been that way  but  is so no longer. Only then, by a process of elimination, will we be in position to 
specify what is meant by constitutional unsettlement in more positive terms. Secondly, the 
concluding part of our discussion will also move from negative to positive in evaluative terms. A 
constitutional unsettlement may not sound like something we should be particularly sanguine about. 
And, it shall be argued, there is indeed much to be concerned with in our state of constitutional 
unsettlement. Nevertheless, the very idea of a condition of constitutional unsettlement need not be 
considered in principle and inevitably pathological. Rather, as a state of affairs that is be in the 
process of becoming more and more embedded in contemporary public life and less and less 
capable of wholesale or even measured undoing or transformation, then, short of fatalistic 
acceptance, we may have no option but to look for the positives. And, having done so, we may find 
more positives than we might have anticipated. 
      But first we turn to the description and explanation of what is meant and what is not meant by 
constitutional unsettlement, and how we have arrived at such a state. What constitutional 
unsettlement is not, as we shall see, is reflected in some clear distinctions in wording, or at least in 
the order of words.  A state of constitutional unsettlement is not, first, a settled constitution, nor is 
it, secondly, an unsettled constitution, nor thirdly, is it a Constitutional settlement. Yet all of these 
other conditions are significant in placing the circumstances of constitutional unsettlement in 
historical and comparative relief. In a nutshell, we used to have something like a settled 
constitution, though it meant, and continues to mean, very different things to different people; we 
                                                 
1
  This text is based upon the annual Public Law Lecture given at Queen Mary College, University of London in 
December 2012. My thanks are due to the School of Law and to the editors of Public Law for being such splendid hosts 
on that occasion.   
University of Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper 2014/11 
 
Page 2 of 23 
 
then, quite recently, moved into the phase of an unsettled constitution, but one whose terminus has 
offered neither a return to a settled constitution nor arrival at a new – and for the UK 
unprecedented, documentary Constitutional settlement. Instead, the unsettled constitution has 
become normalized - or at least regularized - as a state of constitutional unsettlement. 
         Let us look at these various stages in turn. 
   
 
2. The settled constitution 
 
 We begin with the settled and the unsettled constitution. The term unsettled constitution has 
emerged in recent years to account for what one writer has described as "a prolonged moment of 
constitutional fluidity".
2
 We will shortly examine what this entails, but, first, what of the implicit 
contrast with an earlier state of settled constitutionalism?  
       What is meant by the settled constitution? The very idea that Britain ever did have a settled 
constitution is of course a matter of some controversy. But I want to pin down at least a modest 
sense in which that is true and is broadly considered to be so, as it is vital to the set of contrasts that 
I want to draw. My prompt is provided by Vernon Bogdanor in his 2009 book The New British 
Constitution.
3
 There he argued that the "old constitution"
4
 comprised both a distinctive dynamic - 
the evolutionary course of adaptive development so vividly portrayed by Walter Bagehot,
5
 and a 
distinctive doctrine - the sovereignty of Parliament, famously canonized by Dicey as the keystone 
of our constitution.
6
 The basic fit between the two is clear, indeed symbiotic. The persistence of the 
doctrine that Parliament can make or unmake any law and that no other entity can override or set 
aside parliamentary legislation - since it solidified as the pre-eminent norm of the constitution over 
the course of the 17
th
 century - is at one and the same time expression, consequence, and 
reinforcing cause of an evolutionary constitutional order.   
      The sovereignty of Parliament is, first, a clear expression and vehicle of an evolutionary 
constitutional logic. In holding that the Crown-in-Parliament always retains the last (or rather, 
latest) legislative word both against its own previous authority and against any and all other sources 
of law and claims to legal authority, the doctrine treats any and all laws as subject to change by 
                                                 
2
  Evidence of Adam Tomkins, cited in House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee; "The EU Bill and 
Parliamentary sovereignty" 10th Report (2010-11)  para. 24  (An unsettled constitution)  see also P Norton “The 
Unsettled British Constitution”  Politics Review Sep 1st 2006; A. King  “Does the United Kingdom still have a 
Constitution? (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2001). 
3
 (Oxford: Hart, 2009) 
4
 Ibid ch.2. 
5
 The English Constitution (Oxford: OUP, 2009) [First published 1867].  
6
 A.V. Dicey Lectures Introductory to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (London: Macmillan,1885). 
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ordinary legislative process and so facilitates an incremental approach to the reform of the content 
of the constitution. Parliament is competent at any time, and absent any decisive external legal 
constraint, to amend the rules concerning the entire range of constitutional matters, from the 
composition, role and overall pattern of the institutions of government to the relations between 
government and citizens. The persistence of parliamentary sovereignty is also, secondly, one 
consequence of an evolutionary constitutional order. The deep continuities of modern British 
political history – the relative absence of the ruptures of conquest, of political revolution, or of 
territorial fracture or realignment directly affecting the metropolitan centre,
7
 has meant that, once 
established against the courts   and the executive, there has been little occasion – neither clear 
opportunity not irresistible pressure - to depart from the doctrine of the legislative supremacy of the 
central institutional complex of the British state. 
   Parliamentary sovereignty, thirdly, provides reinforcement for the evolutionary constitution. It 
does so in two senses, symbolic and instrumental. Symbolically, parliamentary sovereignty long 
supplied an object of continued affirmation and embedded identification within our political culture. 
It helped to dignify the very notion of evolution - of constitutional gradualism - treating this as the 
dividend of a flexible and responsive centralism based upon a proud and venerable institution rather 
than as a matter of cumulative historical accident and rudderless drift. In addition, parliamentary 
sovereignty supplied the anchor for the broader notion of an unwritten British constitution, allowing 
this to be portrayed as superior to the practice of documentary constitutionalism rather than an 
apologetic second best.   From the 1780s onwards, indeed, in response to events unfolding across 
the Channel and the Atlantic, ‘Paper constitution’ emerged as a term of ridicule, and precisely the 
United Kingdom’s “lack of a written constitution [came] to serve a distinguishing and celebratory 
function”8 for many generations of defenders of our constitutional faith.9  
                                                 
7
 On the history of relative inattention at the English centre of British constitutional thought and practice  to the lessons 
of constitutional flux and the examples of constitutional difference  at the Celtic edges and in the colonial beyond, see  
e.g. C. Bell "Constitutional Transitions: The Peculiarities of the British Constitution and the Politics of Comparison" 
[2014] Public Law forthcoming; see also C. McCrudden, "Northern Ireland and the British Constitution since the 
Belfast Agreement" in J. Jowell and D. Oliver (eds) The Changing Constitution   (Oxford: OUP, 6th edition, 2007) 227-
270. Despite the palpable centrality of the Irish question to British constitutional politics in recent years, it seems that 
this attitude persists. For example, prefacing an otherwise comprehensive, insightful and highly readable recent book-
length analysis of the British Constitution, Anthony King has this to say: “I have said… almost nothing about Northern 
Ireland. That is not because I am not interested in Northern Ireland or because I believe that the province is 
unimportant. It is simply because the politics and the constitution of Northern Ireland are oddly detached from those of 
the rest of the United Kingdom…What happens in Northern Ireland scarcely affects British constitutional development; 
constitutional development in Britain scarcely affects what happens in Northern Ireland…To have added a Northern 
Ireland dimension …would have greatly lengthened the book and…made parts of it incredibly complicated…In 
addition, events in Northern Ireland sometimes proceed at such a pace that it is impossible for the outsider to keep up.” 
The British Constitution (Oxford: OUP, 2007) ix. Apart from the highly questionable hypothesis about the absence of 
mutual causality, the citation of difference, complexity and the speed and urgency of changes at the inner margins of the 
UK constitution as reasons to ignore (rather than to pay special attention to)  these changes reflects the persistence of a 
narrowly metropolitan constitutional mindset.    
8
 Linda Colley Acts of Union and Disunion (London: Profile Book, 2014) 140.  
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        Instrumentally, not only was parliamentary sovereignty a vehicle of gradual adaptation of the 
content of the constitution, but it was itself also a gradually adapted and adaptable vehicle. No 
extraordinary or plainly discontinuous assertion of constitutional authority was required to adjust 
the constitution to new times and circumstances, but merely the latest and so normatively 
continuous assertion of a supple legislative sovereignty doctrine. Through procedures and 
conventions that adjusted the composition of Parliament and the manner and form of its law-making 
from time to time, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty proved pliable enough to allow 
continuity and adaptation, or at least the appearance of continuity and adaptation, in situations 
where the structure, role or reach of the very institution - Parliament - to which the doctrine referred 
was at stake, and where a more rigid doctrine would have provoked rupture. In the case of Union 
with Scotland in 1707, for example, according to the dominant constitutional understanding, though 
with intermittent protests from Scottish political culture and constitutional thought,
10
 the 
sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament merely continued and the new was ‘incorporated into’ 
and absorbed by the old.
11
 Similarly, the initiation of the great democratic revolution of Parliament 
in the Reform Act in 1832, or towards the end of that journey, the move to limit the competence of 
the undemocratic Lords to frustrate the will of the democratic house in the Parliament Acts (1911 
and 49), both promised structural reform of Parliament and its internal relations without disturbing 
the basic concept and status of parliamentary sovereignty.   
          We should not, of course, overstate the extent to which the fit between parliamentary 
sovereignty and an evolutionary process has made for a settled constitution. If we think of a 
constitution as performing three basic sets of normative functions,
12
 the respects in which the UK 
unwritten constitution, with parliamentary sovereignty as its centrepiece, was ever settled, are in 
truth  strictly limited. And, importantly, these limited aspects of settlement are closely linked to the 
low level of resolution we find in other aspects of the constitution. These three sets of normative 
functions are first, authorisation, secondly, institutionalisation and thirdly, the expression and 
sponsorship of a basic  philosophy and set of  principles of government.
13
 In a nutshell, the settled 
part of the UK constitution has concerned authorisation, and to a limited degree  institutionalisation, 
but far less does it extend to substantive philosophy and principles of government.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
9
 Including, famously, both Bagehot (note 5) and Dicey (note 6). 
10
 Grown louder and more insistent in the 20th century, and an important bridging resource for the sovereigntist claims 
that underpin arguments for Scottish independence; see e.g.  N. Walker, "Beyond the Unitary Conception of the United 
Kingdom Constitution" [2000] Public Law 384. 
11
 See in particular A. V. Dicey and R. S. Rait Thoughts on the Union between England and Scotland (London: 
Macmillan, 1920) esp ch.4 ; for discussion, see N. MacCormick Questioning Sovereignty (Oxford: OUP, 1999) ch4 ; C. 
Kidd Union and Unionisms: Political Thought in Scotland, 1500-2000 (Cambridge: CUP, 2008). 
12
 See e.g.,  D. Grimm “Integration by Constitution” (2005) 4 International Journal of Constitutional Law 193-208. 
13
 See  e.g., J. Raz, “ On The Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries” in L. Alexander (ed) 
Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 152 – 193, 153.  
University of Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper 2014/11 
 
Page 5 of 23 
 
     Parliamentary sovereignty is first and foremost a principle of legal authorisation. It lacks the 
dexterity for the detailed division and intricate layering of authority one finds in the  terms of a 
canonical constitutional text, but nonetheless it is just as final and comprehensive in scope as such a 
textual authorisation. It both supplies a fundamental rule of recognition
14
 - telling judges and other 
officials what they should treat as the law of the land, and provides a jurisgenerative precept - a 
deep source of law-making. Parliamentary sovereignty, also, if more generally and less 
determinatively, necessarily implies the centrality of Parliament to the institutional architecture of 
the state.   And in so supplying the doctrinal basis for the "Parliamentary state"
15
, it has two major 
structural effects. First, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty has the consequence of decisively 
empowering whoever could control Parliament, namely the executive; in particular, from the early 
18
th
 century the political or ministerial executive under the prime minister. Secondly, it consigns the 
judiciary to a position where, however important in other respects, they  lack the ultimate authority 
to review the legality of parliamentary legislation.  
       Yet the very stability of parliamentary sovereignty as an authorising rule and as an anchoring 
institutional design, by dint of its empowerment of the executive over the legislature and its refusal  
of any  legal limit  upon what these  political organs of the constitution  can do  - as opposed to how 
they may properly do it - has  also worked against a settled constitution in terms of substantive 
philosophy and principles of government. There is, and there can be, for example, no equivalent  to 
the eternity clauses we find in written constitutions, as in the German endorsement of the 'social 
state',
16
 or the French guarantee of a republican form of government,
17
 or the United States' 
federalism-entrenching  commitment to equality of representation of the states in the Senate.
18
 More 
broadly, the lack  of a written constitution as an alternative and wider seat of sovereignty, with its 
preambulatory statement of  purpose and aspiration, its  holistic normative design, its crystallisation 
and commemoration of a process of conscious and often widely participatory collective self-
determination, and its continuing status as a totem of popular sovereignty and a point of textual 
reference for a trans-generational conversation about self-government,
19
 entails that many of the 
prompts for the elaboration of a common framework philosophy of government have simply not 
been available in the British case.  
                                                 
14
 On the complex relationship between the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and the Hartian idea of a ‘rule of 
recognition’, see A.L.  Young  , 'Sovereignty: Demise, Afterlife, or Partial Resurrection?' (2011) 9 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 163-175. 
15
 D. Judge The Parliamentary State (London: Sage, 1993)   
16
 German Basic Law, Article 20 para 1  
17
 French Constitution, Article 89 
18
 United States Constitution, Article V. 
19
  See e.g.,  Grimm, op cit note 12 
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      This is not to deny, of course, that certain wider and deeper ideas of good government do 
nevertheless inform and infuse the British constitution beyond a bare commitment to parliamentary 
sovereignty and its necessary incidents. But the permissiveness of the parliamentary sovereignty 
doctrine means that these animating ideas remain controversial in theory and contested in practice. 
Some, whether John Griffiths, in his famously plangent utterance that “the constitution is no more 
and no less than what happens”,20 or David Marquand with his rather more colourful description of 
the constitution as a “Palimpsest of sometimes discordant myths, understandings and expectations, 
reflecting the changing values of succeeding generations”21 seek to underline the extent to which 
formal continuity enables substantive discontinuity. Such readings of the constitution occupy no 
single clear position, but an indistinct spectrum of possibilities.
22
 They may embrace, on the one 
hand, a kind of realism in which the absence of a legal authority that constrains as well as enables 
political power  casts  the constitution as an arena  of  raw political competition. And on the other 
hand, they may embrace a more normatively committed stance which makes a virtue of the 
constitutional prominence of political institutions and the affirmation of representative democracy 
and strong political accountability this implies in the modern state,
23
 even if these institutions were 
born  in a pre-democratic age. 
          Other readings of the constitution, typically taking their historical cue from Dicey,
24
 look to 
other legal sources and sensibilities deeply ingrained in our culture of government to moderate or to 
displace the primacy of the political. They look to the Rule of Law, much dependent on common 
law rules against arbitrary power and in defence of basic liberties as applied by a politically 
independent judiciary.  They look also to the influence of constitutional conventions in smoothing 
the rougher edges of political power, both oiling the wheels and checking the excesses of executive 
government. Together these factors are deemed to have supplied a substantive counterpoint to the 
destabilising potential of parliamentary sovereignty.
25
 
      It is not easy to reconcile such diverse positions, but in one sense closely relevant to our 
immediate purpose we are able to do so. For, on both sides of the historical narrative, the settled 
                                                 
20
  J Griffiths “The Political Constitution” (1979) 42 MLR 1, at 19. 
21
 “Pluralism v Populism” (1999) 42 Prospect 27 A palimpsest is a manuscript on which two or more successive texts 
have been written, each erased to make room for the next 
22
 On the contested meaning and significance  of the ‘political constitution,’ both in the seminal work of Griffiths ( note 
20) and as a plausible and normatively attractive account of the British constitution more generally,   see e.g.,  M. 
Loughlin " Modernism in British public law, 1919-79" Public Law (2014) pp.56-67 ; A. Tomkins Our Republican 
Constitution (Oxford : Hart, 2005) ; G. Gee and G. Webber, "What is a political constitution? (2010) 30 Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies, 926-949 ; M. Goldoni "Two Internal Critiques of Political Constitutionalism "  (2012) 10 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 926-949.  
23
 See e.g Tomkins op. cit n22 ; R. Bellamy Political Constitutionalism (Cambridge : CUP, 2007_ chs 4-6; K. Ewing, 
"The Resilience of the Political Constitution"   (2013)  14 German Law Journal 2111-2136   
24
 Op cit, note 6. 
25
 See e.g  J. Jowell and D. Oliver, “Editors’Introduction” in J. Jowell and D. Oliver The Changing Constitution 
(Oxford|: OUP, 7
th
 edition, 2011)  1-6. 
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character of the constitution was indicated by the absence of a propensity to pursue profound or 
wholesale constitutional transformation. One side, emphasising what is sometimes called the 
'political constitution',
26
 has tended to be  instrumentalist in outlook.
27
 It is marked by a recognition 
of the resilient  thinness of the constitution of parliamentary sovereignty, but with the emphasis on 
thinness and on an  appreciation of the opportunity this gave for a “functionalist”28 approach to law 
as the vehicle of political rule. The other side, emphasising what is sometimes called the  'legal 
constitution', has tended to be more traditionalist.
29
 Likewise, there is  recognition of the resilient 
thinness of a constitution long tethered  to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, but here with 
the emphasis on the achievement and the vital additional ingredients of resilience; in particular a 
culture of respect for the  long accumulation of  practice  and  the prominence of various  means 
(common law, conventions)  and voices ( judges, peers, monarchy, civil service)  of  stability. In 
both approaches, reform in the evolutionary constitution is never holistic, but gradual, piecemeal  
and typically unsystematic, either by dint of a lack of interest in the constitution except as a tool or 
resource for the furtherance of a political programme or, conversely, due to a conservative 
reverence, or the display of a conservative reverence,  for it deep tenets. Neither by intensity nor 
scope of ambition is there a challenge to the very foundations of the order. 
      We should be under no illusions that the difficulties of analysis of the settled constitution 
remain profound. How do we measure degrees of continuity in the longue durée of a uniquely 
‘long’ constitution? How, if at all, do we periodize across such a vast historical expanse of the 
unwritten constitution, both pre-and post-parliamentary sovereignty? What even counts as 
constitutionally relevant in an arrangement  that, in its narrow preoccupation with authoritative 
foundations, fails to name or integrate what is constitutional or clearly differentiate between what is 
constitutional and what is not? With which, if any, other constitutions of the world could intelligent 
comparison be made in assessing the relative settlement of the British constitution? 
 Fortunately, we need not attempt to answer these larger questions here. We need merely focus on 
the contemporary disturbance of these narrow areas where, as we have observed, there is a common 
or overlapping sense of the constitution as displaying a historically settled character; as regards 
authoritative foundations and, to some extent, institutional focus, together with the common 
pragmatism of traditionalism and instrumentalism. And we need to show why and how the new 
unsettled constitution has departed from that norm.  
                                                 
26
 Griffiths, op cit note 20  
27
 See e.g. Bellamy op. cit.  note 23; Ewing op. cit. note 23.  
28
 See M. Loughlin Public Law and Political Theory (Oxford: OUP, 1992); "The functionalist style in public law" 55 
University of Toronto law Journal, 361-403. 
29
 Alec Walen, Judicial Review in Review: A Four-Part Defense of Legal Constitutionalism, (2009) 7 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 329;  Tom Hickman, In Defence of the Legal Constitution, (2005) 55 Univ. Toronto 
L.J.981;  see also Bellamy , op. cit. note 23, chs 1-3.  
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3. The unsettled constitution   
 
 Here, as with  the long reign of the  settled constitution, the story lines are familiar. Indeed, the 
basic narrative is more broadly affirmed, its key themes less divisive than in the case of the 
unsettled constitution. Crucially, however, the ending remains very much unresolved. 
     The message  is one of a slow burn of reform, followed by a marked increase in the 
constitutional temperature - a coming to the boil, usually associated with Tony Blair’s New Labour 
government in 1997 though continuing beyond its demise to the Brown administration and the 
present Coalition.
30
 It is a tale of parallel lines of challenge, both to parliamentary sovereignty as an 
authoritative legal doctrine and to the institutional centralism of the parliamentary state. The assault 
comes from many quarters. It comes from the rival legal supremacy claim of an ever more 
juridically assertive and jurisdictionally encroaching European Union,
31
 from entrenchment, albeit 
in weak form, of the Human Rights Act
32
 as the domestic interface of another key transnational 
regime – the Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights, and from the legally and politically 
diverse array of autonomy claims from supporters of self-government in Ireland
33
 and, 
progressively, in Scotland,
34
 and, if in a somewhat lesser key, Wales.
35
 It comes from serial 
efforts,
36
 of diminishing effectiveness,
37
 to reduce and abolish the aristocratic component of the 
House of Lords. It comes from other attempts, more or less successful, to rebalance and redistribute 
power at the centre of the Parliamentary state, through freedom of information,
38
 closer control over 
Parliamentary standards
39
 and electoral reform.
40
 It comes from attempts to bolster the 
independence and rationalise the expertise of the judicial branch of  the constitution, whether 
through the location of a new Supreme Court outside the Palace of Westminster
41
 or the 
                                                 
30
 See e.g. V. Bogdanor  The Coalition and the Constitution (Oxford: Hart, 2011).  
31
 See e.g. R (Factortame Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport (No 2) [1992] 1 AC 603 ; and now, R (HS2Action 
Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 
32
 Human Rights Act 1998, esp. ss 3, 4 and 6. 
33
 Northern Ireland Acts, 1998-2009. 
34
  Scotland Acts, 1998-2012.  
35
 Government of Wales Acts, 1998-2011.  
36
 See esp. House of Lords Act 1999.  
37
 On the failure of the House of Lords Reform Bill 2012, which would have established a mainly elected second 
chamber, see N. Barber "House of Lords Reform: A look in the long grass" UK Constitutional Law Association Blog 
(2012)  http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2012/07/12/nick-barber-house-of-lords-reform-a-look-in-the-long-grass/ 
38
 Freedom of Information Act 2000; see also P. Birkinshaw "Regulating Information" in J. Jowell and D. Oliver op. cit. 
note 25, 365-393.    
39
  See e.g. P. Leopold, "Standards of Conduct in Public Life" in Jowell and  Oliver, op cit  note 25  394-418. 
40
 On the failure of the Alternative Vote referendum in  2011, see P. Whitely, H. Clarke, D. Sanders and M. Stewart, 
"Britain says NO; voting in the AV Referendum" 
http://www.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/research/microsites/epop/papers/Whiteley,_Clarke,_Sanders,_and_St
ewart_-_Britain_Says_NO.pdf 
41
 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, Part 3. 
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introduction of a new Upper Tribunal at the apex of an (at least partly) integrated system of 
administrative justice.
42
 
       All   of these factors have combined to make the constitution more multipolar in its sources of 
authority and less institutionally concentrated. What is more, the process is one that is cumulative 
without being ‘joined-up’, progressive without being planned. Just as parliamentary sovereignty and 
the evolutionary constitution fed off each other, so too the erosion of parliamentary sovereignty and 
declining investment in the settled constitution and in a gradualist approach to its development are 
mutually suggestive and  reinforcing trends. There are a number of different elements to this 
dynamic, each pushing in the same direction. 
 In part this is a matter of legal doctrine. Once the absoluteness of parliamentary sovereignty 
is tested, it becomes progressively easier to chip away at its armour. Consider the line  of key cases 
of recent years where the meaning and extent of the basic doctrine has been at issue, from 
Factortame
43
 to Thoburn,
44
 from Jackson
45
 to Axa
46
 and now to the HS2 case.
47
 While these 
challenges have met with only modest success, the tools of critique have been sharpened. The sheer 
diversity of claims from very different areas of our constitution, from the countervailing authority 
of the European Union,
48
 to the ‘Parliamentary’ standing of a devolved legislature49 to the very 
jurisdiction  of the courts as a check on the internal rules and processes of Parliament,
50
 creates  a 
richly diverse resource of  critical legal opinion.  And crucially, the special character of the doctrine 
of  parliamentary sovereignty renders it peculiarly susceptible to the accumulation of critical reason. 
For parliamentary sovereignty used to be  treated as axiomatic, as the platform on which 
constitutional reason stood and so as itself before and  beyond reason. Once parliamentary 
sovereignty is seen as  challengeable, its citadel in principle capable of being breached, then it must 
in turn  be defended through reason where once it was matter of unassailable faith. There is a deal 
of difference, actual and latent, between a doctrine that is viewed as the unimpeachable top rule and 
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43
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one whose superiority must forthwith be argued for  and weighed in the same or similar fashion to 
other deep principles of the constitution.
51
 
       The unsettling of the constitution is also, more prosaically, a matter of the logic of political 
consequentialism. It is a story of spillover and unintended consequences, of domino effects and the   
multiple adjustments provoked by the disturbance of any embedded system. There are many 
examples of this type of causal connection. The crafting of the new Supreme Court was in part 
inspired by concerns over the standing  of the House of Lords, technically part of the legislature, as 
an impartial  guarantor of a fair trial under  Article 6 of  the ECHR, as incorporated by the Human  
Rights Act.
52
 Repeated and growing concerns about  the ability of the Westminster government and 
Parliament to represent specifically  English concerns and aspirations fully and fairly have been  
fuelled by the development of devolved Parliaments with significant legal competence  in territories 
that nevertheless continue to send significant numbers of MPs to London to vote on questions that 
affect English voters but no longer those in their native constituencies.
53
Agitation for reform of the 
House of Lords as a legislative chamber is  motivated not only by basic democratic concerns, but  
also by the prospect of  some kind of regionally sensitive upper chamber for a gradually dispersing, 
quasi-federal United Kingdom.
54
 And to  take but one more, and highly topical case, the viability  
and popularity of plans for sub-state autonomy in the Celtic nations, most immediately in the 
Scottish independence debate, are intimately linked to the  fact and terms of continuing supra-state 
membership. In crude terms, the plausibility of a new level of sovereign autonomy below the British 
state is widely seen to depend in not insignificant part upon the conditions of participation in a 
regime which claims a portion of sovereignty rights above the level of  the state.
55
 
           These political and doctrinal considerations have fed into and fed off a  broader cultural shift 
in attitudes to our constitutional situation. In part this is a matter of 'high' academic and political  
culture. Over half a century there has been a progressive intensification of debate over the 
"changing constitution"
56
 and how it might be addressed. The settled constitution was something 
whose virtue was not only unwritten, but often unseen and unspoken, and  simply  taken for granted 
                                                 
51
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A.L. Young (eds) Sovereignty and the Law: Domestic, European and International Perspectives (Oxford: OUP, 2013)  
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 See. E.g., the proposals for regional representation in the coalition's abortive  proposals for Lords' reform; HM 
Government House of Lords Reform Draft Bill May 2011, Cm 8077.  
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by establishment elites; indeed, it was a constitutional form whose virtue, whether from an 
instrumentalist or a traditionalist perspective, lay  partly in the fact that it could be taken for 
granted. Today, tacit affirmation has been replaced by a more explicit and more sharply 
differentiating form of position-taking and defending. For example, recent positions such as 
common law constitutionalism,
57
 constitutional pluralism,
58
 and the increasingly stylised 
contemporary reconstructions of political and legal constitutionalism,
59
 connect the worlds of 
academic and professional elites and seek either to feed directly into the doctrinal bloodstream, or at 
least to provide alternative interpretations of our constitutional heritage and its implications for 
current development. More generally, a busy industry of detailed constitutional analysis and 
monitoring has grown up,
60
 and this  broader enterprise connects to a new political interest and, to 
some extent, a popular interest in "generative" rather than "programme" politics.
61
  In part this feeds 
off the many particulars of the reform agenda, and in part it flows from and back into a more  
general sense of  anxiety and disillusionment with  the political process.
62
 
        Finally, these various tendencies are also connected with broader changes in the transnational 
and trans-state environment. Not only have the EU and the ECHR been important post-war catalysts 
for constitutional transformation and reflection, but these and other contemporary challenge to the 
external sovereignty of the state, from the growth of 'world order'
63
 Treaty  organisations such as 
the United Nations and the International Criminal Court to the development of many new forms of 
private or hybrid regulation beyond the state, provide a permanently altered backdrop for our 
domestic constitutional debate
64
 Parliamentary sovereignty no longer supplies a mark and guarantor 
of  closely aligned internal and external legal and political capacity.
65
 Internal authority  is no  
longer  sufficiently capacious or closely integrated   to supply a secure platform for unqualified title 
in international relations; equally, unqualified international title no longer exists to justify 
exhaustive internal capacity.    Rather the intensified encroachment of international actors upon 
what was  once a domestic monopoly and the greater disaggregation and dispersal of the domestic 
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branches of government  across transnational regime-building and decision-making – most 
obviously and immediately but by no means exclusively in the context of the EU
66
 - serves to blur 
the boundaries between internal and external domains and to provide a new and fluid menu of 
possibilities for constitutional change.  
 
4. Beyond the unsettled constitution 
 
If this combination of doctrinal, political, cultural and  geopolitical factors helps accounts for the 
unsettled constitution, can it also account for where the unsettled constitution might lead? Here the 
trail of argument becomes more complex, the possible pathways divergent. 
       In the first place, some have viewed the unsettled constitution, at least implicitly, as an 
extended episode - as a phase with a beginning and an end. A particular conjuncture of forces 
reached  a tipping point of intensity under a New Labour government attuned to the dynamics 
described above and unprecedented in its apparent willingness to embrace constitutional reform as a 
systematic programme. However, it was always a programme of finite purpose and limited 
aspiration, and a combination of initial achievement and a less auspicious political climate for  
structural  change might suggest that the natural lifespan of the project is over or at least drawing to 
a close,  and that the constitution, now somewhat transformed, is ready to 'settle down' again.
67
 
        Another perspective, shading into and sometimes difficult to distinguish from the first, views 
the new phase as  perhaps more than a temporary episode but still less than a disjunctive change. 
Instead, it  is viewed as embodying  a new state  of dynamic constitutional equilibrium, one 
characterised by a steadily  continuing  commitment to reform. The history of Jeffrey Jowell and 
Dawn Oliver's influential text, The Changing Constitution, is highly instructive in this regard. The 
first edition in 1985 was an explicit tribute to the incrementalism of Britain's settled constitution. 
Published to mark the one hundredth anniversary of Dicey's The Law of the Constitution, it 
cautioned that the slow evolution  of practice meant that, a century on, Dicey, though still 
important, could no longer be seen  as a full or  reliable guide to constitutional practice.
68
 The 
presumed need for the publication of a seventh edition of Jowell and Oliver a mere quarter of a 
century on in 2011 is itself a mark not only of the remorselessness of incremental change, but also 
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of its "quickening pace".
69
  The increased momentum of the New Labour years is explicitly noted, 
but this is woven into an analysis that sees a diet of reform towards "renewal but not perfection"
70
 
as the new normal state. 
      A third perspective treats the period of the unsettled constitution as a prelude to and preparation 
for a new Constitutional settlement. From Lord Hailsham in 1976  railing against the "elective 
dictatorship"
71
 of contemporary  executive-dominated and ideologically committed Party 
government to the Institute of Public Policy's draft  Constitution  of 1991,
72
 and from  Gordon 
Brown's  Governance of Britain Green Paper  in 2007,
73
 to the very recent deliberations of the 
Political and Constitutional Reform Committee of the House of Commons,
74
 many - even  where 
they have fallen short of a full endorsement of a textual initiative - have been  prepared to 
contemplate the period of the  unsettled constitution as facilitating, necessitating or otherwise 
foreshadowing a more formal or deliberate Constitutional settlement. 
      None of these three answers, however, is convincing. The episodic approach would struggle to 
explain the extent to which the reform agenda has continued, and in significant respects even 
accelerated, after the New Labour years. Alongside renewed attempts at the reform of the House of 
Lords and the electoral system, we have witnessed serious contemplation of reform of domestic 
human rights commitments made under the 1998 Act,
75
 mooted in the shadow of protracted 
reconsideration of Britain's international commitments under the ECHR.
76
 We have also seen, first, 
a new intent to impose a referendum check on any extension of EU powers in the European Union 
Act 2011,
77
 and, more recently, the more radical step of a commitment by the Conservative Party - 
the dominant party in the present Coalition,  if re-elected, to hold an 'in-out' referendum on 
continued EU membership in 2017 after a period of attempted renegotiation and reduction of the 
present scope of European integration.
78
 And in the area of regional autonomy, we have seen 
                                                 
69
 “Editors’ Introduction” op. cit. note 25, 1.  
70
 Ibid 
71
  "Elective dictatorship". The Listener: 21 October 1976, 496-500. 
72
 The Constitution of the United Kingdom (London: IPPR, 1991). 
73
  Cm 7170,  para. 212.  
74
 Do we need a constitutional convention for the UK?  (2013) HC 371; See also Government Response to the House of 
Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee Fourth Report of Session 2012-13 Cm 8749. 
75
 Commission on a Bill of Rights A UK Bill of Rights? The choice before us December 2012 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/about/cbr 
76
 See in particular, High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights Brighton Declaration 
April 2012  http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2012_Brighton_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf 
77
 Ss 2,3 and 6. See further, P. Craig, “The United Kingdom, The European Union and Sovereignty” in Rawlings, 
Leyland and Young (eds), op. cit. note 51, 165-185. 
78
 For the full text of David Cameron’s EU speech at Bloomberg, see  The Guardian 23rd January 2013 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/jan/23/david-cameron-eu-speech-referendum 
University of Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper 2014/11 
 
Page 14 of 23 
 
accelerated moves towards greater dispersal of powers. The Silk Commission 
79
 has reinforced the 
momentum towards a fuller system of legislative and fiscal devolution in Wales set in place by the 
1998 and 2006 Acts and already enhanced by the 2011 referendum, while a referendum on Scottish 
independence, notwithstanding the insertion of increased legislative and tax-raising  powers,  post-
Calman Commission
80
 in the Scotland Act 2012,
81
 looms as a pivotal constitutional moment in 
September of this year.  
        This catalogue of activity also serves to indicate that the alternative idea of a new equilibrium 
committed to ongoing constitutional adjustment betrays a similar tendency to understate the pace 
and unpredictability of change. Many meditations   on the present state of the constitution, 
especially from the metropolitan centre, see in the accelerated pace of change an even greater need 
to rely upon the unwritten constitution's historical flexibility.  We observe that in Jowell and 
Oliver's account, for example,
82
 and also in Anthony King's recent affirmation of the abiding virtues 
of our Eton-style constitutional "mess."
83
 However, as our analysis of the four intertwined dynamics 
of change already indicated, the idea that such an intensity and diversity of change can be absorbed 
by the normal adaptability of the unwritten constitution is highly questionable. Rather, there is a 
sense, to which we return below, in which the dynamic of constitutional reform feeds itself and so 
doing creates disequilibrium, whetting an appetite that cannot be fully or finally satisfied. 
        What, lastly, of an unsettled constitution as the harbinger of a new Constitutional settlement? 
This could be seen either in terms of a formal documentary settlement, or as something more 
informal - more in keeping with the unwritten tradition, but still nevertheless the de facto  
crystallisation of a new constitutional order. Some saw the Blair New Labour reforms as producing 
such a new constitutional settlement.
84
 Quite apart from subsequent evidence which suggested 
otherwise -  a distinctly unsettled settlement - closer examination of the Blair program, even as it 
happened, reveals a somewhat disparate collection of differently motivated projects 
opportunistically brought together under the convenience of a common constitutional cover. What 
is more, some of the programme priorities and tendencies  of the Blair government, including 
successive anti-terrorist measures and lukewarm support for regional devolution in England or for 
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restoration of the long eroded powers of local government, seemed to run against the rights-
respecting and decentralising  grain of the wider constitutional aspiration.
85
 
     Perhaps, though, this is an unrealistic standard to set. There is an undeniable sense in which 
many major Constitutional settlements involve an element of strategic bundling.  They embrace an 
aggregation of concerns as much as a holistic diagnosis and a rounded vision - an appeal to the 
better collective nature of the political community and its authors as much as a consistent practical 
commitment. And so we should be careful not to be too harsh in our assessment of the recent 
British record.  
      However, normally a Constitutional settlement is not just a rhetorical construction, but also 
involves a distinctive procedural discipline. There is usually a special process - Convention, 
Commission or the like - of bringing the measures together for common consideration and treating 
them with greater solemnity, of seeking their coherence and demanding their rounded reflection. It 
is precisely this discipline that helps transform the piecemeal into the holistic, and that encourages 
the better nature of overall long-sighted reflection alongside the inevitability of discrete issue-by-
issue contestation. And it is this discipline, or its absence, that inevitably brings us back to the 
second sense of a  Constitutional settlement; namely the production of a canonical written 
constitution.           
           Yet the contemporary British history of formal constitution-writing, as we have remarked, is 
one of occasional initiative, but with little by way of serious political momentum. Partly, this is 
because of the legacy of the informal settled constitution. There is reluctance, even on the part of 
those who acknowledge the importance of an ongoing reform agenda, to give up either on a 
tradition of symbolic distinctiveness or on a measure of normative flexibility, which, as already 
noted, can be argued to be at an even greater premium in an age of constitutional flux. That 
reluctance often translates as ambivalence about the value of a constitutional settlement, an attitude 
tellingly manifest in the tendency to link the idea of constitution-making to the idea of 
codification.
86
 This suggests a  halfway house in which any new arrangement accrues the symbolic 
dividend and systematizing benefit of a visible settlement, but in so doing precisely sets itself 
against any constitutive project of detraditionalization  and of root and branch renewal. But the 
other part of the story of the absence of a constitutional settlement from the political agenda has to 
do, more basically, with the profound difficulties of reaching a new joined-up agreement in today’s 
                                                 
85
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Britain. Even where a new constitutional settlement may be favoured for its popular credentials and 
transformative potential, the prospects of a serious initiative remain palpably distant for its 
supporters.
87
 Not only would the substantive agenda of a new constitutional agenda be formidably 
open-ended  - that, after all, is the challenge of any new Constitution, and  one that is often 
overcome by the urgency of the moment or the rare propitiousness of the circumstances. In 
addition, however, as we develop below, in what we might understand as a paradox of initiative, the 
very factors that might concentrate minds most urgently on a new settlement at the level of the 
fundamental law of the state also serve, in the British case, to militate against the generation of the 
common political will necessary to deliver that  unprecedented result. 
 
 5. Constitutional Unsettlement 
 
The idea of a constitutional unsettlement emerges from a sense that each of the alternatives for the 
British constitution - the settled constitution, the temporarily unsettled constitution, and the new 
Constitutional settlement, are either unavailable or increasingly remote in prospect. A constitutional 
unsettlement, then, is a combination of certain deep-lying, historically informed structural features 
of the constitution which contribute to and flow from the closing off of these other options as  
viable alternatives, together with the mindset this structural background tends to encourage. Let us 
try to specify the different aspects of this.  
   To begin with,  the  combination of doctrinal, political, cultural and external changes producing 
the dynamic of accelerating constitutional movement both reflects and reinforces uncertainty and 
disputation over the sources of constitutional change. The sovereignty of parliament, challenged, 
modified but far from overturned, continues to provide the touchstone of constitutional change. It 
supplies the more or less contentious baseline to which all efforts of constitutional reform must 
refer, whether they seek to endorse the doctrine in its traditional form, to modify it to their ends, or 
to replace or supplement it. This can lead to a kind of gridlock between the forces of conservation 
and change, and to a coding of debate in unproductively, and potentially destructively oppositional 
terms.  On the one hand, debates over the legal versus the political constitution, over common law 
versus statute, over courts versus legislature,  over a  “bipolar sovereignty” 88  of judges and 
Parliament  versus the singular authority of the latter, over a gradation of  "constitutional statutes"
89
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and non-constitutional statutes versus a flatland of ordinary laws, reflect continuing “congestion”90 
at the centre of our constitutional order. Because the “commanding heights”91 of our constitution are 
still defined in terms of a narrow institutional unity, the access routes to these heights are 
constricted and hotly contested between  the two branches of government - legislature and judiciary 
-  who are themselves interested parties in the debate, with neither branch either willing or required 
to concede the final word. On the other hand, where a more direct challenge to the constitutional 
order arises, as in the case of Irish or, now, albeit in a very different climate, Scottish nationalism, 
the fact that this must be addressed within the frame of parliamentary sovereignty, rather than 
through a broader process of constitutional reform that does not lie within the gift of the 
government and legislative majority of the day, can lead to forms of polarization that do not aid 
considered deliberation.  The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is prone, in these 
circumstances, to become part of the problem, or at least to be viewed as such – staunchly defended 
or implicitly relied upon on the one hand, and treated as part of the very pathology to be resisted or 
overturned on the other
92
 – rather than, as might be the case of a special legislative pathway for 
constitutional reform if such were available, as a procedure for brokering the reconciliation of 
different visions. 
In the second place, uncertainty, disputation and disorderly diversity as regards the instruments 
of constitutional policy follows from this more fundamental narrowness of the axis of constitutional 
authority and change. Just because we have no canonical process for making or entrenching or 
otherwise embedding constitutional reform, a number of surrogate institutions and mechanisms 
emerge to fill the vacuum. Various Parliamentary Committees, for example, have been projected or 
have projected themselves as agents or stewards of the process of constitutional change, from the 
House of Lords Constitution Committee to the House of Commons Political and Constitutional 
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Reform Committee and the Joint Committee on Human Rights.
93
 So too, various commissions of 
inquiry of quite different pedigree perform a similar role as agents of change. The Calman 
Commission for Scotland and the Silk Commission for Wales, for instance, have worked to very 
similar remits in recent years, and been similarly influential in their respective devolution debates. 
However, whereas the Silk Commission was established by the British government, the Calman 
Commission was the creature of the Scottish Parliament.  The referendum has also emerged as a 
key surrogate instrument of constitutional reform.
94
  It has done so in areas as diverse as devolution 
in  Scotland and Wales, sovereignty in Northern Ireland,  Scottish independence,  regional 
devolution in England, and European Union membership, supplying an ad hoc mechanism to 
authorize constitutional change where the normal pathways are deemed to lack the requisite 
constitutional gravitas or are of disputed  legitimacy. Other hybrid instruments of constitutional 
policy include the new range of concordats governing relations between the parts and the centre of 
the UK constitutional order in the absence of a formal federal system,
95
 and the Memorandum of 
Agreement between Scottish and UK governments – the so-called ‘Edinburgh Agreement’ – to 
develop a clear legislative and administrative pathway to the independence referendum. This 
operated as a kind of ‘internal’ international agreement – a form of “para-diplomacy”96 reflecting, 
once again,  the intense intersection of considerations of internal and external sovereignty in the 
present constitutional debate.  
Of course, every constitutional order will have a variety of instruments and mechanisms of 
constitutional policy, not all of which will be mandated by a canonical constitutional document. 
However, what is distinctive about the UK case is the absence of any systematic and broadly 
authoritative machinery   of constitutional expression and reform. The surrogates themselves - the 
parliamentary committees, the expert commissions, the referenda etc., often reflect and amplify the 
very difficulties of considered and authoritative constitutional resolution they are deployed to 
address. They are often of uncertain authority, either due to their unclear or doubtful pedigree or  on  
account of concerns over their broader fitness for purpose.  Often, moreover,  disagreement over 
sources - who gets to decide -  shades into disagreement over tools - what means should be used - 
as, for example, in the highly topical  question of the  appropriate procedure of succession of an 
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independent Scotland  to the EU.
97
 What we see in the context of our emerging constitutional 
unsettlement is the frequent recurrence of attempts to find the appropriate and effective legal  
register in which to address new constitutional  problems whose very novelty tends to expose the 
inadequacy or inappropriateness of  the received  way of dealing with these things. Often we are 
looking for short-cuts or place-fillers in the absence of designed-for-purpose mechanisms, or we are 
looking at attempts to achieve some kind of symbolic solemnity of process in the absence of an 
agreed instrument of authority.
98
 In any case, as with sources, this encourages a continuing 
disputation and accompanying meta-conversation about constitutional fitness for purpose, but one 
where by definition there is no authoritative method to resolve  or even to hold the debate.  
In the third place, as already indicated, the kind of canonical constitutional settlement that might 
address and resolve many of these problems of authority is unavailable for some the very reasons 
that it is most needed.  Partly, this is about the symbolic link between constitutional integrity and 
polity identity. Constitutions, as have already observed, perform many normative functions, but 
they also perform an expressive function, affirming the integrity of the polity to which they refer.
99
 
The champions of Scottish independence, or of an all-Irish state, have little or no interest in a 
settlement that would lock them into the United Kingdom, even if it were to provide potentially 
more authoritative and more reliable constitutional methods of negotiating difference and 
guaranteeing equality of rights between different national communities within the state. Similarly, 
those most acutely concerned about the encroachment of the European Union into traditional areas 
of national sovereignty will have little interest in a pan-European constitutional solution, even if it   
were to supply  red lines that  protects national competence, since  such a solution would  also 
likely  cement British membership  and undergird the long term authority of the European Union. 
Partly, too, the paradox of initiative is also a matter of attention deficit and the lack of common 
feeling that betrays. It has been remarked in the context of the geographical  division of the British 
state  that different constitutional agendas at the metropolitan centre and in the minority nations are 
not only  about overt conflict, but are  as much a matter of distinct priorities and an attendant 
mutual indifference and disregard. 
100
 Lack of concern to put and resolve things in common, then,  
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as much as sharply distinct political identities,  militates against the kind of joined up thinking 
which would address questions of disputed authority in a  holistic manner. 
      In the fourth place, uncertainty about the sustainability of the constitutional unsettlement 
becomes unavoidable. The Scottish question is reaching a defining moment. The future of Britain in 
the EU is more precarious than at any time since we joined in 1973, or at least since the referendum 
of 1975, just at the point when the future of the EU itself has never looked less predictable and 
more sharply polarised, with fiscal Union today a more likely option than ever, but no more so than 
the loosening of the Union into a graduated arrangement of core and periphery. Other constitutional 
questions may not be so momentous, but are nevertheless fluid and uncertainly poised. Welsh 
devolution forges ahead, seemingly encouraged by the example and educated along the pathway of 
its Scottish near neighbour. The Irish settlement remains an often  tenuous compromise between 
starker alternatives. The possibility of a British Bill of Rights, and a loosening of  bonds with the 
ECHR and its Strasbourg Court is more tangible than ever, just at the point when the EU is about to 
become a member  of the ECHR.
101
    What is more, the switch from uncertain to critical – from 
amber to red - can happen very quickly, and very unpredictably,  in the multipolar constitutional 
unsettlement. Only five years ago, for example, but just before the Euro crisis, Antony King could 
write, with little fear of contradiction from constitutional players and observers, that there was no 
foreseeable threat from the EU quarter to the integrity of the British constitution.
102
  
       Fifth and finally, it follows that in our state of constitutional unsettlement there is little option 
but to accept its unpredictable trajectory and its fluid and fragile integrity. This does not mean, of 
course, that particular outcomes are not and should not be the focus of struggle, or even that certain 
key constitutional struggles may not be resolved beyond the short-term.  It does mean, however, 
that there are so many sites of uncertainty and fluctuating movements, and so interconnected are 
these, that the overall profile of the constitutional unsettlement is likely to remain fluid and 
changeable. Though there are likely to be key actors who do not accept this diagnosis, or at least 
who claim not to do so in pursuit of the political prizes associated with the promise of more certain 
outcomes,
103
 all the options in lieu of a constitutional unsettlement seem to be exhausted or absent 
from the horizon – to belong either to a fast-receding past or to a remote future. As we have seen, 
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after the unraveling of the previous regime under Blair’s reform agenda, there can be no easy return 
to the settled constitution. Equally, the new unsettled and uncertainly dispersed constitution cannot 
be controlled and cabined  from a concentrated centre, as tends to be assumed in the dynamic 
equilibrium model of the unsettled constitution. Nor, as we have seen, can the unsettled constitution 
plausibly be fast forwarded to a new state of Constitutional settlement where a definitive line may 
be  drawn under the age of unsettlement. 
 
6. Living with constitutional unsettlement 
 
If our constitutional unsettlement is here to stay for the unforeseeable future, what, if any, positives 
may be set against the concerns listed above? In the space remaining, I can do no more than sketch  
a basic outline of what these might be. 
First, there are certain virtues in the pluralism that the state of constitutional unsettlement 
crystallizes. The multipolar constitution, balanced, however precariously between London, 
Edinburgh, Belfast, Cardiff, Brussels and Strasbourg, necessarily involves some recognition of 
difference, some accommodation of diversity. The key balance may be one of power and of 
strategy, rather than the kind of normative weighing-up we increasingly associate with a certain 
type of legal reasoning - in particular judicial reasoning in a certain kind of integrated constitutional 
arrangement,
104
 but there are also some advantages in this starker form of pluralism.  Political 
considerations tend to predominate. Indeed, as we have seen in the Edinburgh Agreement, and in 
the turn to referenda over both Europe and Scotland, we find an explicit endeavour to keep the 
constitution out of the courts and within the political system. This makes for a process in which 
democratic considerations, admittedly far from perfectly suited to circumstances where the very 
identity of the demos is a key prior question, assume priority. It is also a process that forces and 
keeps differences out in the open. There is no camouflaging of the vital choices to be made, no 
mediation through judicial institutions whose authority over such palpably political questions may 
be increasingly subject to question.
105
 
     Secondly, there is also a certain virtue in the retention of constitutional fluidity. Above we 
argued that the lack of a canonical authority lies at the heart of the uncertainty and contentiousness 
over both constitutional sources and constitutional instruments in our state of constitutional 
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unsettlement, and we cautioned against an attitude that responded to this with a complacent re-
affirmation of the genius of our flexible tradition. Yet, given that an absence of canonical authority  
accurately reflects the contemporary state of play within our wider political culture, better a candid 
expression of this than an imposed orthodoxy. If we take, again, the case of the Scottish 
independence referendum, while parliamentary sovereignty may  have  appeared to give a bare 
authority to the centre to impose its will, it also allowed the centre discretion, which was duly 
utilised, to come to a negotiated settlement.
106
 This surely compares favourably with a situation, 
such as that of Catalonia, where the Spanish state and Constitution, confronted with a claim to 
autonomy subject to similar levels of popular endorsement and of  similar legitimacy to that of 
Scotland, simply does not countenance a legally competent process of secession, or any mechanism, 
such as a referendum, that is conducive to that process.
107
 Indeed, as the increasingly fluent pattern, 
and sometimes turbulent course, of  multi-level constitutionalism in the member states of the EU 
more generally demonstrate, the UK is far from alone in tending towards a condition of 
constitutional unsettlement. In these circumstances, a constitutional settlement that enshrines an 
agreement that no longer holds in political practice, or gives power to a non-political   institution  
such as a court in circumstances that have become more politically volatile, can find that its 
authority system operates as a straitjacket, and so as an impediment rather than a guide to a 
balanced resolution. 
  Thirdly, if the constitutional unsettlement is multipolar in nature, as in the British case, then 
even the key threshold  questions – Scottish independence or not, EU membership or not, are never  
black and white,  but  matters of degree. Legal authority in an interconnected transnational world 
comes not in organically compact blocks but is salami-sliced across a range of polities.
108
 This has a 
double effect. It means, objectively, that constitutional statuses such as independence, though still 
profoundly important, are less categorical than once they were; independent Scotland, for example, 
would still seek to be in the European Union, and in a whole raft of other ‘British’ and  transnational 
arrangements.
109
 Independence would come with a significant, and unsettled, residue of 
interdependence, just as continued interdependence allows a considerable, and unsettled element of 
independence.
110
  Reinforcing these more fluid possibilities, the division of authority also shifts 
political expectations. The absence of  bright lines encourages more spectral solutions – as we have 
seen in the early mooting of a third ‘devo max’ option in the current Scottish independence debate, 
and more pertinently, in a nationalist agenda for independence which aspires  to retain significant 
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parts of  the Union state – social, monarchical and currency in particular. The abrupt discontinuities 
that supply the dark side of unsettlement, therefore, are situated much more on a continuum than 
may appear at first glance. 
      Finally, the state of constitutional unsettlement stands in an interesting relationship to questions 
of identity politics. Historically, constitutionalism has had a complex but largely singular 
relationship with various forms of unity. Constitutions, to repeat, are both normative ways of 
organising the integrity of a polity and expressive means of symbolising the identity of a people. 
Often they are emphatically both, as they have been in the United States of America, and even when 
one dimension outweighs the other, they usually remain intricately linked.
111
 Perhaps, however, that 
intimate link is under threat, together with the more divisive ways in which constitutional 
symbology has underlined politico-cultural identity. Perhaps the new state of constitutional 
unsettlement, rather than tracking and reinforcing politico-cultural singularity will come to stress 
law's role in mediating and accommodating the very absence of such singular relationships. 
Perhaps, then, our constitutional law will become more an education in the limits and fragile 
interdependence of political communities, and less a force that seeks to vindicate the underlying 
unity of any one community. Constitutional unsettlement, if looked squarely in the face, may turn 
out to be a ‘least worst’ solution for a world in which constitutional sovereignty, both as an 
organizing device and as a measure of belonging, is not what it used to be. 
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